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THE DESTINY OF CLEAN ENERGY: LEGALITY OF THE EPA’S
CLEAN POWER PLAN WITH RESPECT TO EMISSIONS TRADING
Samuel H. Helton*
Cleaner energy is necessary to avoid significant health and
climate risks in the future, and no energy is dirtier than our
nation’s fossil-fuel burning power plants. The United States
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) Clean Power Plan
seeks to address the hazards posed by the electricity sector, and
proposes carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions trading as an
efficient, cost-effective option to do so. This Recent Development
argues that the Clean Power Plan should be upheld with respect to
emissions trading. First, a reasonable interpretation of section
111(d) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) provides a legal basis for
carbon dioxide emissions trading. Second, a thorough analysis of
North Carolina’s legislative history provides an example of why
carbon dioxide emissions trading is legal without authorization
from state general assemblies. Further, emissions trading allows
for easier Clean Power Plan compliance by power plants. The
EPA should be granted the deference to set emissions trading as a
valid compliance option.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a future with significantly fewer premature deaths,
heart attacks, asthma attacks, and hospitalizations each year.
Transitioning to cleaner energy sources can realize this future,
along with several other global health and climate benefits, by
*
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reducing the emission of harmful air pollutants.1 Greenhouse gas
pollution threatens the United States, and the world, because it
creates long-lasting and damaging impacts on our climate, which
negatively affect public health and the environment.2 CO2 is the
most widespread greenhouse gas (“GHG”) pollutant, accounting
for nearly seventy-five percent of global GHG emissions and
eighty-two percent of total U.S. GHG emissions.3 The largest
source of CO2 emissions are power plants, accounting for thirtyone percent of total U.S. GHG emissions.4 On August 3, 2015,
President Obama announced the EPA’s release of the final version
of the Clean Power Plan.5 The rule, created under section 111(d) of
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), is meant “to protect human health and
the environment by reducing CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-fired
power plants in the U.S.”6 By 2030, the Clean Power Plan aims to
achieve CO2 emission reductions of approximately thirty-two
percent from CO2 emissions levels in 2005.7 However, many states
and organizations disapprove of the plan and will likely challenge
the legality of the plan in court.8 According to Environment and
1

See generally FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Benefits of a Cleaner, More
Efficient Power Sector, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-benefits.pdf (last updated Aug. 13,
2015) (discussing the health and climate benefits realized by the Clean Power
Plan by shifting to cleaner energy).
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See id.
5
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64661 (Oct. 23,
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan Final
Rule], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/201522842.pdf.
6
See id. at 64664.
7
See id. at 64665.
8
See, e.g., Andrew Harris, Obama, EPA Defend Clean Power Plan Against
States’ Challenge, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Aug. 31, 2015, 6:04 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-31/obama-epa-defend-cleanpower-plan-against-states-challenge (explaining that fifteen states, led by West
Virginia, asked a federal court in Washington to delay the Clean Power Plan);
Q&A: EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Power Plants,

17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 43, 45
Legality of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan and Emissions Trading
Energy Publishing, the leading source for comprehensive, daily
coverage of environmental and energy policy and markets, “Less
than 12 hours from when President Obama’s landmark regulations
for power plants were published in the Federal Register, it became
the most heavily litigated environmental regulation ever and
seemingly destined for the Supreme Court.”9
Among the several potential targets for litigation,10 the legality
of emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan will be heavily
CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/federal/
executive/epa/q-a-regulation-greenhouse-gases-existing-power (last visited Nov.
6, 2015) (stating that a number of states have already brought legal actions
challenging the Clean Power Plan, and several more will most likely join their
effort); Reuters, Fifteen US states seek to block Obama’s clean power plan, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2015, 5:42 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/aug/14/fifteen-us-states-seek-block-obamas-clean-power-plan
(stating that fifteen state attorneys general petitioned a federal court in
Washington to block the Clean Power Plan); Davide Savenije, 15 states launch
legal battle against EPA’s Clean Power Plan, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 17, 2015),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/15-states-launch-legal-battle-against-epas-cleanpower-plan/404105/. Fifteen states have filed a petition for an emergency stay
with the U.S. Court of Appeals against the Clean Power Plan. Id. The states are
arguing that the EPA cannot regulate an emissions source under 111(d) if it is
already regulated under section 112, and that the EPA can only regulate
emissions at the smokestack and may not implement anything “outside the
fenceline”. Id.; Samantha Page, 16 States Think The EPA’s Emissions Rule Isn’t
Legal And They Shouldn’t Have To Comply, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 6, 2015,
1:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/08/06/3688652/first-shot-atfinalized-clean-power-plan-arrives/ (discussing how sixteen states had already
formally requested an administrative stay of the Clean Power Plan less than a
week after its release).
9
Legal Challenges – Overview & Documents, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (2015),
http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal.
10
See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, The Clean Power Plan Will Survive: Part 1,
LAW 360 (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/704046/the-cleanpower-plan-will-survive-part-1 (providing that four prominent legal targets of
the Clean Power Plan are: (1) whether the CAA section 111(b) rule setting
carbon standards for new and modified power plants, which is the precondition
of section 111(d), is valid; (2) whether section 111(d) is even enforceable after
the two separate versions passed from the House and Senate; (3) whether the
EPA can implement “beyond the fenceline” options, such as emissions trading;
and (4) whether the Clean Power Plan violates the Tenth Amendment); Keith
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scrutinized.11 Those opposing the plan believe that section 111(d)
of the CAA offers no legal authority for an emissions trading
program.12 Furthermore, opposing parties insist that state
legislation authorizing CO2 emissions trading is required, even if a
trading program is found to be legal under the federal plan.13
Goldberg, Legal Eagles Question EPA Authority For Clean Power Plan, LAW
360 (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/631957/legal-eaglesquestion-epa-authority-for-clean-power-plan
(discussing
two
additional
challenges to the Clean Power Plan: (1) that utilities regulated under CAA
section 112 cannot be regulated under Section 111(d); and (2) that the Clean
Power Plan violates the sovereignty of the states under the Fifth and Tenth
Amendments).
11
See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, A Quick Legal FAQ on EPA’s Clean Power
Plan, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (July 14, 2015), http://www.rff.org/blog/
2015/quick-legal-faq-epa-s-clean-power-plan (stating that the emissions trading
is one of the four main legal risks of the Clean Power Plan); William W. Buzbee
et al., The Clean Power Plan: Issues to Watch, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM 57–58 (Aug. 2015), http://progressivereform.org/articles/CPP_1506.pdf
(acknowledging that emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan will be a
legal issue, but arguing in support of an emissions trading program).
12
See, e.g., Joe Koncelik, Clean Power Plan – An Ambitious Plan with
Serious Legal Issues, OHIO ENVTL. L. BLOG (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://www.ohioenvironmentallawblog.com/2015/08/articles/climate-change/
clean-power-plan-an-ambitious-plan-with-serious-legal-issues/ (describing how
opponents of the plan argue that section 111(d) is limited to requiring certain
technologies to be installed at the power plants themselves, and doesn’t allow
for outside reductions, such as an emissions trading program); Nathan
Richardson, A Quick Legal FAQ on EPA’s Clean Power Plan, RESOURCES FOR
THE FUTURE (July 14, 2015), http://www.rff.org/blog/2015/quick-legal-faq-epas-clean-power-plan (stating that section 111(d) does not explicitly allow
trading).
13
See, e.g., Craig Gannett, Implementing Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act:
The Pathway to Regional Cap-And-Trade Programs?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN.
L. FOUND. SPECIAL INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE L. & REG. 12 (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.dwt.com/files/Publication/564b041d-5bbe-4167-b8e6-c17233b67198/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/85c4e92a-492b-4de7-9144-c1bfd55a6f0b/Ga
nnett%20Regional%20Cap%20%20Trade%20Paper%201-15.pdf (suggesting the
need for state legislation authorizing the participation of state clean air
regulators in a regional emissions trading organization); Multistate Coordination
Resources for Clean Power Plan Compliance: Sample Documents for
Consideration, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY
COMMISSIONERS 19 (June 2015), http://www.naruc.org/Grants/Documents/
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This Recent Development argues that there are several reasons
that the Clean Power Plan should be upheld with respect to
emissions trading, and explains why CO2 emissions trading is legal
without authorization from state general assemblies. Part II
discusses the legislative authority behind the Clean Power Plan,
how states can comply, and the concept behind CO2 emissions
trading. Part III assesses the legality of the Clean Power Plan’s
CO2 emissions trading program and describes how it is a key
component in state compliance. Finally, Part IV concludes by
illustrating that authorization from state general assemblies is
unnecessary for states to legally implement an emissions trading
program, using North Carolina as an example.
II.

THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: AUTHORITY, COMPLIANCE,
AND EMISSIONS TRADING
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan has two main objectives.14 The
first is to establish guidelines that reflect both the unique way in
which the power system operates, and the actions, strategies, and
policies that states and utilities have already undertaken to reduce
CO2 emissions.15 The United States’ power system is an
interconnected, interdependent, and complex network of power
plants and transformers connected by thousands of miles of highvoltage transmission lines.16 Several states and utilities have
already incorporated on-site power plant technologies, or have
participated in regional emissions trading programs to reduce their
CO2 emissions.17 The plan’s second objective is to provide states
Multistate%20111d-Coordination-FINAL%20_June2015.pdf (stating that a
common theme among opposing states is that authorizing state legislation is
necessary for state plans, or parts thereof, such as an emissions trading
program).
14
See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64665.
15
See id.
16
Top 9 Things You Didn’t Know About America’s Power Grid, DEPT. OF
ENERGY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://energy.gov/articles/top-9-things-you-didntknow-about-americas-power-grid.
17
See, e.g., New Natural Gas Generation: Project Overview, DUKE ENERGY
(2015),
https://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/natural-gas-overview.asp
(discussing how Duke Energy retired three coal-fired power plants and
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and utilities with a number of compliance options and significant
flexibility in how they achieve their assigned emissions goals.18
The CAA provides the statutory authority for the state
implementation plans (“SIPs”) used to meet these two objectives.
This section discusses the basis of the Clean Power Plan by
focusing on: (A) the statutory authority from which the plan was
created, (B) the options for state compliance under the plan, and
(C) the role of CO2 emissions trading for state compliance.
A.

Statutory Authority
The EPA created the Clean Power Plan pursuant to section
111(d) of the federal CAA,19 which gives the EPA authority to
regulate emissions of air pollutants from existing sources by
requiring states to adopt emissions “standards of performance” for
those sources.20 The regulations created under section 111(d)
should establish a procedure similar to CAA section 110,21 which
requires the state in question to adopt a SIP and submit that plan to
the Administrator of the EPA and discusses the necessary contents
to be included within the plan.22 The EPA shall require the SIPs
created and submitted to the Administrator under section 111(d) to
establish “standards of performance” for any existing source for
any air pollutant for which air quality criteria have not been issued
under CAA sections 108(a) or 112(b), but to which a “standard of
performance” would apply if such existing source were a new
implemented five natural gas-fired power plants in order to significantly reduce
harmful emissions while greatly increasing electricity generating capacity);
Welcome, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2015), http://www.rggi.org/
(discussing how RGGI, a cooperative among nine northeastern states, is the first
market-based program in the United States to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
through regional cap and trade).
18
Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64665. The plan discusses
several potential compliance options for states to meet their emissions goals, and
leaves significant flexibility to the states in deciding which compliance options
to use. For further discussion see infra notes 41–68.
19
See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64663.
20
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015).
21
Id. § 7410(a) (2015).
22
See id.
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source under CAA section 111(b).23 “Standard of performance” is
defined as “a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects
the degree of emission limitation achievable through the
application of the best system of emission reduction [(“BSER”)]
which . . . the Administrator determines has been adequately
demonstrated.”24 This process of regulating under section 111(d) is
explained through three steps.25
First, the EPA releases “guideline documents” that identify
different systems for reducing emissions and determine the BSER
for the pollutant being regulated, in this case CO2.26 The BSER
must be adequately demonstrated through consideration of cost,
energy requirements, and environmental impacts.27 Furthermore,
the guideline documents have emissions criteria indicating the
level of emissions reduction achievable through implementation of
the BSER.28 Second, as discussed above, each state creates a SIP
establishing a standard of performance and discussing how that
standard will be implemented and enforced.29 It is important to
note that states play a significant role under section 111(d).30 It is
the states, not the EPA, that create the standards of performance
and determine how the sources within state borders will meet those
standards.31 The EPA’s guidance is only to serve as a reference for
the states in making their decisions.32 Lastly, each state submits
their Section 111(d) SIP to the EPA for approval based on whether
23

Id. § 7411(d) (2015).
Id. § 7411(a)(1) (2015).
25
See Jeremy M. Tarr, Jonas Monast & Tim Profeta, Regulating Carbon
Dioxide under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, NICHOLAS INSTITUTE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE UNIVERSITY, NI R 13-01 1, 6 (Jan.
2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_r_1301.pdf (discussing the background and process for regulating under section
111(d) of the CAA).
26
See id.
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
See id. For further detail on the second step see supra notes 22–26.
30
See id. at 7.
31
See Tarr et al., supra note 25, at 7.
32
See id.
24
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the SIP satisfies the baseline criteria required by EPA’s
guidelines.33 If a state fails to submit a plan or submits a plan that
the EPA determines does not meet the basic criteria laid out in the
guidelines, the EPA may develop a federal implementation plan34
and apply it to the state.35
Using the statutory authority of section 111(d), the EPA
determined the BSER for CO2 under the Clean Power Plan to
include three “building blocks”: (1) heat rate improvements at
affected coal-fired steam electric generating units (“EGUs”),
(2) substituting lower-emitting natural gas combined cycle units
for reduced generation from higher-emitting affected steam
generating units, and (3) substituting increased generation from
new zero-emitting renewable energy generating capacity for
reduced generation from affected fossil fuel-fired generating
units.36 Building block one is designed to improve the efficiency of
burning coal resulting in fewer CO2 emissions from coal-fired
power plants.37 Building block two simply means replacing coalfired power plants with natural gas combined cycle power plants.38
Building block three suggests incorporating more renewables
while preserving existing and under-construction nuclear power
plants.39 These three building blocks are approaches available to all
affected EGUs for achieving state compliance; however,

33

See id.
See, e.g., Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From
Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014;
Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations; Proposed Rule,
80 Fed. Reg. 64966 (Oct. 23, 2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22848.pdf.
35
See Tarr et al., supra note 25, at 7.
36
See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64667.
37
See Jonathan L. Ramseur & James E. McCarthy, EPA’s Clean Power Plan:
Highlights of the Final Rule, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R44145
CRS Report 1, 5 (Aug. 14, 2015), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R44145.pdf.
38
See id.
39
See id.
34

17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 43, 51
Legality of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan and Emissions Trading
compliance is not strictly limited to these three approaches.40 The
next section of this Recent Development explains how states will
comply with the mandatory baseline requirements of the Clean
Power Plan.
B.

State Compliance
The Clean Power Plan requires states to submit to the EPA
either an initial or final SIP by September 6, 2016.41 States
submitting an initial plan can request a two-year extension from
the EPA to submit their final plan by September 6, 2018.42
However, states granted the extensions are required to submit plan
progress reports by September 6, 2017.43 As for the structure of
state compliance plans, the Clean Power Plan presents two types of
SIPs for states to choose from: (1) an “emissions standards”
approach, or (2) a “state measures” approach.44 An emissions
standards SIP approach would implement the federally enforceable
emission rate standards45 directly at the EGUs in the state.46 This
type of plan could involve multiple states and include an emission
rate trading system or a mass-based trading system.47 In contrast, a
state measures SIP approach would allow states to achieve the
40

See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64667; see also David
Doniger, Understanding the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, SWITCHBOARD:
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Aug. 11, 2015),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ddoniger/understanding_the_epas_clean_p.html
(discussing how emissions trading and energy efficiency are two of the most
prominent compliance options that are not included within the Clean Power Plan
Final Rule’s three building blocks).
41
See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 2.
42
See id.
43
See id.
44
See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64709; see also The Role of
States: States Decide How To Meet Their Goal, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug.
2015), http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/fs-cpp-states-decide.pdf (discussing
how states can choose which type of SIP they want to submit to the EPA).
45
For further explanation of the emission rate standards, see infra notes 49–
61.
46
See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 2.
47
See id. For further discussion of emission rate and mass-based trading
systems see infra notes 69–75.
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equivalent of the CO2 emissions standards approach by using a
combination of federally enforceable standards and elements that
would be enforceable only under state laws.48 No matter what type
of plan a state chooses, the desired result is to meet the emissions
goals created for that state by the EPA.
To generate state emissions goals under the Clean Power Plan
final rule, the EPA first established CO2 emission performance
standards for two subcategories of affected EGUs: (1) coal and oilfired power plants, and (2) natural gas combined cycle power
plants.49 Second, the EPA divided the states into three regions and
compiled 2012 data of CO2 emissions and electricity generation
from each affected source in each state.50 Third, using the final
rule’s three building blocks, the EPA calculated annual emission
rates for each type of affected EGU in each of the three regions.51
Finally, the EPA generated state-specific interim emissions goals
and final emissions goals by applying the annual performance rates
for each type of EGU to each state’s 2012 baseline fossil fuel
generation mix.52
The EPA represented each state’s emissions goals in three
different forms: (1) rate-based goals measured in pounds per
megawatt-hour (lbs/MWh)53, (2) mass-based goals measured in

48

See id. (providing that examples of measures only enforceable under state
laws are renewable energy and/or energy efficiency requirements that could be
applied to affected EGUs or other entities within the state); see also Clean
Power Plan – Technical Summary for States, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/technical-summary-for-states.pdf.
49
See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 5.
50
See id.
51
See id.
52
See id. For examples of state goals, see Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra
note 5, at 64961–64 (providing the three different formats of emissions goals for
each state. One example is North Carolina, which has an interim emissions rate
goal of 1,311 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour and a final emissions rate goal
of 1,136 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour).
53
See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 5 (discussing that the typical
rate target for emissions is measured in pounds (of CO2 in this case) released
from the smokestacks per each megawatt-hour of electricity generation).
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total short tons of CO254, and (3) mass-based goals with a new
source complement55 measured in short tons of CO2.56 Using these
goals, states then develop and submit customized SIPs that ensure
power plants in their state achieve their interim and final goals.57
The interim goals must be achieved on average over the eight-year
period of 2022 to 2029.58 In addition, the EPA requires states to
demonstrate their progress of implementing a gradual application
of the best system of emission reduction with “glide paths” that
states identify for reduction over three time periods: 2022–24,
2025–27, and 2028–29.59 Furthermore, states must fully achieve
their final goals by 2030.60 However, even though states are not
officially required to take action until 2022, the EPA created a new
program, the Clean Energy Incentive Program, to “reward early
investments in renewable energy (RE) generation and demand side
energy efficiency (EE) measures . . . during 2020 and/or 2021.”61
The Clean Power Plan gives states great flexibility in selecting
which compliance options they prefer to use to meet their
emissions goals.62 Examples of these various compliance options
54

See id. The EPA used the state-specific emission rate targets to calculate
equivalent state-specific mass-based targets, which are measured in metric tons
of CO2. Id. Although EPA’s emission rates are in pounds per megawatt-hour,
most national and international measures of CO2 emissions are provided in
metric tons. One metric ton is approximately 2,205 pounds.” Id.
55
See New Source Complements to Mass Goals Technical Support Document
for CPP Final Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 2015),
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/tsd-cpp-new-source-complements.pdf#_ga=
1.15399349.225111521.1440261320 (explaining that the mass-based goals with
new source complements represent the EPA’s estimated new source emissions
associated with satisfying incremental demand from 2012).
56
See FACT SHEET: Components of the Clean Power Plan: Setting State
Goals to Cut Carbon Pollution, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-components-clean-power-plan
(last updated Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter FACT SHEET: Components].
57
See id.
58
See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 3.
59
See id.
60
See FACT SHEET: Components, supra note 56.
61
See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 9.
62
See FACT SHEET: Components, supra note 56.
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include: retiring older coal-fired power plants, switching to natural
gas combined cycle power plants, incorporating more renewables,
incorporating other non-emitting sources such as nuclear and
hydropower, decreasing energy demand by taking measures to
increase energy efficiency, and participating in an emissions
trading program.63
According to the EPA, emissions trading, through which
affected power plants may meet their emissions standards via
emission rate credits (for a rate-based standard) or allowances (for
a mass-based standard), is arguably the most cost-effective method
states can use to meet their goals.64 However, emissions trading, by
itself, provides several different compliance options. States can
engage in emissions trading through formal multistate agreements
within multistate SIPs, or by creating a single-state SIP that is
“trading-ready.”65 A SIP is “trading-ready” if it provides an EPAapproved, or EPA-administered, credit/allowance tracking system
and indicates that it would recognize for compliance any emission
credit/allowance issued by another state.66 Furthermore, the EPA’s
federal implementation plan, the plan states must adopt if the EPA
rejects their individual SIP, is based on a federal CO2 cap and trade
program.67 Therefore, the concept of emissions trading is prevalent
in a variety of manners and areas under the EPA’s Clean Power
Plan final rule. The specifics of emissions trading are discussed in
the following section.

63
See generally Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 9 (discussing all of
the potential compliance options states can take under the Clean Power Plan).
64
See FACT SHEET: Components, supra note 56.
65
See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64735. Multistate plans
must explicitly identify partner states that can interact while trading. Id.
66
See id. at 64839.
67
See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FEDERAL PLAN REQUIREMENTS
FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS
CONSTRUCTED ON OR BEFORE JANUARY 8, 2014; MODEL TRADING RULES;
AMENDMENTS TO FRAMEWORK (2015), http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/cpp
-proposed-federal-plan.pdf (explaining that the proposed federal implementation
plan is based on rate- and mass-based emissions trading programs).
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C.

CO2 Emissions Trading
Emissions trading is a proven approach to address air
pollution.68 According to the EPA, “[e]mission trading is a marketbased policy tool that creates a financial incentive to reduce
emissions where the costs of doing so are the lowest and clean
energy investment enjoys the highest leverage.”69 Environmental
market-based policy tools are regulations that encourage
appropriate environmental behavior through price signals rather
than through implicit instructions.70 In the Clean Power Plan’s
case, it is simply the act of setting prices on an instrument
representing a certain amount of reduced emissions, and the
process of buying and selling those instruments through an
economic market. The financial incentive generated through
emissions trading is the potential for an EGU to generate excess
income by reducing its own emissions, either at fossil fuel-fired
plants or by using renewables, and selling the right to emit those
emissions to another EGU on the market.
Trading provides an EGU with alternatives to direct
implementation of emission reduction measures in its own facility
when lower-cost emission reduction opportunities exist

68

See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CAP AND TRADE: ACID RAIN PROGRAM
RESULTS (2002), http://www3.epa.gov/captrade/documents/ctresults.pdf (stating
that the acid rain emissions trading program created a 9% reduction in harmful
sulfur dioxide emissions in 2002 from 2000 and a 41% reduction from 1980
levels. Furthermore the trading program created a 13% reduction in harmful
nitrogen oxide emissions in 2002 from 2000, and a 33% decline from 1990
levels); RGGI Benefits, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (2015),
http://www.rggi.org/rggi_benefits (stating that emissions trading under RGGI
has avoided 1.3 million short tons of CO2 through 2013, and is projected to
avoid 10.3 million short tons of CO2 throughout its lifetime).
69
See FACT SHEET: Components, supra note 56.
70
See Robert Stavins & Bradley Whitehead, Market-Based Environmental
Policies, from Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty, Eds., Thinking
Ecologically, The Next Generation of Environmental Policy, YALE UNIVERSITY
PRESS (1997), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/stavins/files/market_
based_environmental_policies.pdf (defining and discussing market-based policy
tools in an environmental context).
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elsewhere.71 The plan gives states the option to generate emissions
rate credits, or allowances, based on whether they choose rate- or
mass-based emissions goals.72 An EGU that exceeds its emissions
goals will generate credits or allowances to sell, while an EGU that
fails to meet its goals can correct its short-coming by purchasing
credits or allowances from states that surpass compliance goals.73
The states must incorporate and define, within their SIPs, the value
of an emission credit/allowance.74 Although implementing an
emissions trading program seems like a logical choice for state
compliance, many states and organizations are challenging its
legality of under the Clean Power Plan.75
III.

LEGALITY AND IMPORTANCE OF CO2 EMISSIONS
TRADING FOR STATE COMPLIANCE
Opponents to CO2 emissions trading first argue that it falls
outside the scope of CAA section 111(d). Critics of the plan insist
that section 111(d) only authorizes “inside-the-fenceline”
approaches to emissions reductions and does not allow “outsidethe-fenceline” approaches.76 “Inside-the-fenceline” approaches,
such as building block one,77 are emissions-cutting actions that the
71

See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64735.
See id. at 64734–35.
73
See id.
74
See id. Usually a credit/allowance is equal to one ton of the pollutant
emitted, therefore it could be equal to one ton of CO2 under the Clean Power
Plan.
75
See, e.g., William W. Buzbee et. al., The Clean Power Plan: Issues to
Watch, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM at 11, 57–58 (Aug. 2015),
http://progressivereform.org/articles/CPP_1506.pdf
(acknowledging
that
emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan will be a legal issue, but arguing
in support of an emissions trading program); Nathan Richardson, A Quick Legal
FAQ on EPA’s Clean Power Plan, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (July 14,
2015),
http://www.rff.org/blog/2015/quick-legal-faq-epa-s-clean-power-plan
(stating that the emissions trading is one of the four main legal risks of the Clean
Power Plan).
76
See Richardson, supra note 11.
77
For further discussion on the BSER and building block 1 see supra notes
27–40.
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actual facilities being regulated, existing power plants, can take.78
In contrast, “outside-the-fenceline” approaches include emissionscutting actions through sources other than existing power plants,
including renewables, nuclear, energy efficiency, or by substituting
less polluting power generation through emissions trading.79 This
differentiation between “inside-the-fenceline” and “outside-thefenceline” approaches is important to opponents of the Clean
Power Plan because they suggest the Plan includes “outside-thefenceline” approaches, and if section 111(d) is found to exclude
these measures then they could succeed in having the plan struck
down in court. However, all of the compliance measures within the
Clean Power Plan are arguably “inside-the-fenceline” because
even if measures are implemented through sources other than the
actual affected sources, these measures should still result in
reducing emissions from the actual affected EGUs. Therefore, the
end result of any approach under the Clean Power Plan would
succeed as an “inside-the-fenceline” approach. However, for
purposes of this Recent Development, the targeted approach is
emissions trading.
Focusing on emissions trading, critics argue that section 111(d)
does not authorize emissions trading, but other parts of the CAA
do, therefore trading under section 111(d) should not be an
option.80 An example of this can be found within section 112(d)(2),
which notes that emission reduction may be achieved “through
application of measures, processes, methods, systems or techniques
including, but not limited to, measures which . . . .”81 Section 112
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See Richardson, supra note 11.
See id.
80
See, e.g., Robert R. Nordhaus & Ilan W. Gutherz, Regulation of CO2
Emissions From Existing Power Plants Under § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act:
Program Design and Statutory Authority, EVNTL. L. REP. (2014),
https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/docs/article_2014_04_44.10366.pdf
(discussing the differences between Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act and
other sections that explicitly allow emissions trading); Richardson, supra note
11 (pointing out that section 111(d) does not explicitly allow emissions trading).
81
See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2015).
79
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goes on to describe measures which generally reduce emissions.82
Even though emissions trading is not explicitly stated as an option,
Section 112 authorizes it by stating that allowable options are not
limited to the measures discussed therein, and emissions trading
has consistently been proven to reduce emissions overall.83
As discussed above, section 111(d) only discusses creating
standards of performance for existing sources to regulate certain
pollutants, in this case CO2, and therefore, does not explicitly
allow or suggest any type of trading.84 Notably, section 111(d) does
not expressly forbid trading either.85 Opponents of the Clean Power
Plan are attempting to act upon this legal ambiguity. However,
under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,86 if a statute is ambiguous courts defer to the administrative
agency’s interpretation, as long as its interpretation is reasonable.87
Chevron revolutionized the process by which courts defer to
administrative agencies when dealing with questions of statutory
interpretation.88 The issue in Chevron was the definition of the
term “stationary source” within the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).89 The
CAA required states in nonattainment under the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) to establish a permitting
program regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of
air pollution.90 The EPA regulation promulgated to implement this
permit requirement allowed states to adopt a plant-wide definition
of the term “stationary source.”91 This plant-wide definition was
82

See id.
For further detail, see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
84
See generally supra notes 20–26, see also 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015).
85
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015); see also Richardson, supra note
11.
86
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
87
Id. at 866 (holding that EPA’s definition of the term “source” is reasonable
and a permissible construction of the statute because the statute is ambiguous
and EPA is the expert on the subject matter).
88
See generally id.
89
See id. at 840.
90
See id.
91
See id.
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known as the “bubble policy” and allowed states to treat all
pollution emitting structures within the same facility as one
“stationary source.”92 The question at issue was whether EPA’s
“bubble policy” definition was based on a reasonable construction
of the CAA’s statutory term “stationary source.”93 The Supreme
Court held in favor of the EPA, deciding that the EPA’s definition
was a permissible construction of the statute because it furthered
the goal of the CAA which sought to promote progress in reducing
air pollution along with economic growth.94 Chevron created a test
that whenever Congress has not directly spoken to the precise legal
question at issue, the statute is ambiguous. The court will defer to
the agency’s interpretation as long as it is a permissible
construction of the statute.95
Applying Chevron to the CAA, Congress has not spoken to the
precise legal question of emissions trading within section 111(d),
and the EPA’s interpretation that section 111(d) allows CO2
emissions trading should be found to be a reasonable, permissible
construction of the statute. Similar to the court’s conclusion in
Chevron, allowing emissions trading under section 111(d) will
further the CAA’s overall goal of reducing air pollution while
spurring economic growth. The legality of emissions trading can
be supported through several long-standing CAA regulations
incorporating trading, and the legal precedents upholding those
CAA regulations. These regulations include: (A) the Title IV Acid
Rain Program; and (B) the EPA’s pollution transport rulemakings.
The EPA’s pollution transport rulemakings under subsection (B)
include: (1) the call for nitrogen oxide state implementation plans,
and (2) the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule.
A.

Title IV Acid Rain Program
The Acid Rain Program provides strong legislative support for
upholding emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan. In
92

See id.
See id.
94
See id. at 866.
95
Id.
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response to acid rain studies96 and improved emissions modeling97,
the EPA established the Acid Rain Program under Title IV of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.98 The Acid Rain Program was
the first national cap and trade program in the country, and it
introduced a system of allowance trading that uses market-based
incentives to reduce nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) and sulfur dioxide
(“SO2”) pollution.99 The program allocated each utility a number of
emissions allowances in proportion to their historical percentages
of total emissions, with the total number of allowances limited to
the capped levels.100 In addition to the specifics of the program
under Title IV, Title V implements the provisions of the Acid Rain
Program through a permitting process.101 Similar to the Clean
Power Plan, each permit application must include a compliance
plan for the affected source that details how that source will meet
the Title IV requirements.102 Furthermore, the utilities under the
Acid Rain Program have the flexibility to choose among several
options to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions, such as adding
emissions controls, replacing existing controls with more advanced
technologies, optimizing existing controls, switching fuels, using
banked allowances, or buying allowances from the market.103
96

See generally CAP AND TRADE: ACID RAIN PROGRAM RESULTS, supra note
68. (discussing that the studies of acid rain and its impacts on human health and
the environment led to the CAA amendments to address the acid rain caused by
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides).
97
As the level of technology increased, experts could study and record more
accurate levels of pollutants in the atmosphere and the harm they were causing
by using improved computer modeling.
98
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2015) (the main section amended in the
1990 amendments); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Acid Rain Program,
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://www2.epa.gov/airmarkets/acid-rain-program.
99
Id.
100
Richard N. L. Andrews, State Environmental Policy Innovations: North
Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act, 43 ENVTL. L. 881, 884 (2013).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2015); see also Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra
note 5, at 64696.
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See id.
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U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Acid Rain Program Market Based
Mechanisms,
(2015),
http://www2.epa.gov/airmarkets/acid-rain-programmarket-based-mechanisms.
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Therefore, the only clear distinction between the Acid Rain
Program and the Clean Power Plan is the pollutant being regulated,
NOx and SO2 versus CO2, respectively.
B.

Pollution Transport Rulemakings
In addition to the Acid Rain Program, the EPA’s pollution
transport rulemakings also provide legislative support for
upholding emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan. Section
110 of the CAA applies to SIPs for NAAQS.104 Section 110’s
“Good Neighbor Provision” requires SIPs to prohibit emissions
that contribute significantly to nonattainment or interferes with
other states’ NAAQS attainment.105 Similar to the Clean Power
Plan, section 110 also provides that the EPA must issue a federal
implementation plan, when a SIP is denied, but in this case it is to
prohibit the “Good Neighbor Provision’s” emissions “at any time”
within the next two years.106 Two major EPA transport rulemakings
support emissions trading: (1) the NOx SIP Call, and (2) the CrossState Air Pollution Rule.
1.

NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call
In 1998, the EPA issued the NOx SIP Call,107 which required
several states upwind of affected states to reduce emissions of NOx
that would drift and impact downwind states with ozone
problems.108 The EPA set emission reduction requirements based
on reductions achievable through “highly cost-effective” measures,
similar to the EPA setting building blocks under the BSER of the
Clean Power Plan.109 Next, the EPA determined that a uniform
emission rate on large EGUs along with a cap-and-trade program
104

42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2015).
See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64696.
106
See id.
107
Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing
Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57354 (Oct. 27, 1998). This is the
rule known as the NOx SIP Call.
108
See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64696.
109
See id.
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was an option available as a “highly cost-effective” measure.110
With that determination, the EPA created the NOx Budget Trading
Program.111 The D.C. Circuit in Michigan v. EPA112 upheld the NOx
SIP Call’s trading program, creating yet another legal precedent
supporting emissions trading.113
Michigan v. EPA addressed the EPA’s promulgation of
NAAQS for air pollutants, which states must implement, maintain,
and enforce through SIPs.114 The EPA issued a final rule, the NOx
SIP Call, which called for states to revise their SIPs to mitigate
interstate transport of the ozone precursor, NOx, because the
emissions from some states were negatively affecting other states
that were downwind of the emissions.115 Several upwind states
petitioned the rule.116 The Supreme Court held in favor of the
petitioning states because it found that the EPA failed to
demonstrate that the states contributed significantly to the
nonattainment of acceptable NOx emissions in downwind states.117
However, the Court upheld the provisions of the NOx SIP Call,
such as its emissions trading program, because the EPA’s scheme
for uniform controls regarding NOx emissions were not arbitrary
and capricious.118 Thus, the holding of Michigan v. EPA supports
upholding emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan because
the EPA’s intentions behind emissions trading advance the CAA’s
goals of reducing air pollution, and those intentions do not meet
the standard of arbitrary and capricious.
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See id.
Id.
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213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
113
Id. at 688 (holding that EPA’s NOx budget trading program reasonably
established reduction levels and leaves the control measure selection decision to
the states).
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See id. at 669.
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2.

Cross-State Air Pollution Rule
Similar to the NOx SIP Call, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule
reinforces the legality of emissions trading under the Clean Power
Plan. Prior to the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (“CSAPR”), the
EPA created the Clean Air Interstate Rule (“CAIR”) in 2005.119
CAIR was very similar to the NOx SIP Call, except it required
upwind states to reduce NOx and SO2 emissions to protect
downwind states from negative impacts.120 Emission reduction
requirements were determined based on known cost-effective
controls for EGUs.121 As with the NOx SIP Call, the EPA also
established a cap-and-trade program for sources of NOx and SO2 in
states that chose to participate in emissions trading within their
SIPs and for states ultimately subject to a federal implementation
plan.122 However, the D.C. Circuit remanded CAIR in North
Carolina v. EPA123 because it found the cost-effective standard of
the trading program to be unlawful.124 North Carolina v. EPA
examined CAIR’s failure to describe how its trading program
would achieve the goals of not contributing to the nonattainment of
downwind states when each upwind state’s contribution to another
state was unknown.125 Although the case was remanded, the Court
kept CAIR in place until the EPA could develop an acceptable
substitute because the concept behind the program was legal, just
not the proposed structure of the trading program.126
As a result of this ruling, the EPA introduced CSAPR in 2011
as the substitute for CAIR.127 CSAPR had the same purpose as
CAIR, and simply fixed the EPA’s original application of the cost119

See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64696.
See id.
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531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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Id. at 930 (holding that CAIR’s trading program was unlawful because it
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See id. at 901–02.
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effective standard. Under CSAPR, the EPA determined the
emission reduction requirements based on reductions available at
certain cost thresholds by EGUs in each state.128 The EPA also
issued federal implementation plans that subjected states to
emissions trading programs to achieve reductions.129 The Supreme
Court in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.130 upheld the
EPA’s application of cost to set emission reduction requirements,
as well as the EPA’s authority to issue federal implementation
plans with emissions trading programs.131 The Court analyzed the
factors the EPA must consider when determining an upwind state’s
contribution to the nonattainment of downwind states.132 The Court
of Appeals had held that the CAA required the EPA to only
consider each upwind state’s physically proportionate
responsibility for each downwind state’s air quality problem
without consideration of cost.133 The Supreme Court disagreed and
upheld the EPA’s consideration of cost in emissions trading as a
permissible construction of the statute.134 This holding created yet
another legal precedent supporting emissions trading under the
Clean Power Plan.
In conclusion, CO2 emissions trading is a legal and important
aspect of the Clean Power Plan. The legality of emissions trading
under the Clean Power Plan is legislatively supported by the Title
IV Acid Rain Program, the NOx SIP Call, and the Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule. Furthermore, the legality of emissions trading
under the Clean Power Plan is supported by a plethora of case law,
including Chevron, Michigan v. EPA, and EME Homer. Therefore,
128
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134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
131
Id. at 1610 (holding that the Good Neighbor Provision of the CAA does
not require EPA to disregard costs, and that EPA’s cost-effective allocation of
emissions reductions among upwind states through federal implementation plans
with trading programs is a permissible, workable, and equitable interpretation of
the CAA).
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the Clean Power Plan should be upheld with respect to the legality
of emissions trading.
IV.

EMISSIONS TRADING WITHOUT STATE LEGISLATION: A
LOOK AT NORTH CAROLINA
Opponents to CO2 emissions trading argue that states cannot
implement a CO2 emissions trading program without obtaining
authorization by each state’s general assembly.135 In particular,
opponents allege that state general assemblies must specifically
authorize the use of emissions trading in Clean Power Plan SIPs.136
However, unless a state has already passed legislation explicitly
prohibiting a CO2 emissions trading program, there is no legal
basis to deny a state from including emissions trading in their SIP
under the Clean Power Plan. This is because, as discussed above,
several statutes, regulations, and cases exist that support the
legality of emissions trading programs.137 An analysis of North
Carolina’s legislative history provides a foundation for why North
Carolina, and other states, can legally establish interstate trading
programs for CO2 emissions without authorization from their
general assemblies.
Interstate trading of CO2 emissions will likely be legal in North
Carolina without authorization from the General Assembly.
Currently, there is no North Carolina statute explicitly prohibiting
135

See, e.g., Craig Gannett, Implementing Section 111(D) of the Clean Air Act:
The Pathway to Regional Cap-And-Trade Programs?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L.
FOUND. SPECIAL INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE L. & REG. 12 (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.dwt.com/files/Publication/564b041d-5bbe-4167-b8e6-c17233b67198/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/85c4e92a-492b-4de7-9144-c1bfd55a6f0b/Ga
nnett%20Regional%20Cap%20%20Trade%20Paper%201-15.pdf (suggesting the
need for state legislation authorizing the participation in a regional emissions
trading organization); Multistate Coordination Resources for Clean Power Plan
Compliance: Sample Documents for Consideration, THE NAT’L ASS’N. OF REG.
UTIL. COMMISSIONERS 19 (June 2015), http://www.naruc.org/Grants/Documents/
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For more detail see supra notes 97–136.
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the implementation of a CO2 emissions trading program. In fact,
there are several provisions within North Carolina’s general
statutes and administrative code that support the legality of
implementing a CO2 emissions trading program.138 As discussed
below, the legality of a trading system is supported through: (A)
North Carolina statutes and regulations on air quality standards and
classifications, and (B) existing state restrictions on trading for air
quality. Subsection (B) is further divided into: (1) The Clean Air
Act’s acid rain cap and trade program, and (2) the North Carolina
Clean Smokestacks Act.139
A.

North Carolina statutes and regulations on air quality
In adopting state law to implement the CAA, the North
Carolina General Assembly directed the Environmental
Management Commission, “[t]o develop and adopt standards and
plans necessary to implement requirements of the federal Clean
Air Act and implement[] regulations adopted by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency.”140 The purpose of the EPA’s
Clean Power Plan is to enforce new emissions standards under
section 111(d) of the federal CAA. Therefore, the North Carolina
Environmental Management Commission, as part of the North
Carolina Department of Environment Quality (“DEQ”), has the
authority, and is required to adopt a SIP to meet the emissions
requirements laid out in the final federal Clean Power Plan. Since
the federal rule presents a trading option,141 The DEQ should be
able to legally implement a trading system without authorization
from the North Carolina General Assembly.
This is not the first time DEQ has acted to implement an EPA
policy without authorization from the N.C. General Assembly. In
adopting state law to implement the CAA NAAQS, the North
Carolina General Assembly also directed the Environmental
138

See, e.g., Improve Air Quality/Electric Utilities, N.C. Sess. Laws 2002–4,
S.B. 1078 § 1(i) [hereinafter The Clean Smokestacks Act]; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-215.107(a)(10) (2014); 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2D.2408(a) (2015).
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See The Clean Smokestacks Act, supra note 138.
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Management Commission to develop and adopt a program of
incentives to promote voluntary emissions reductions, suggesting
an emissions trading program.142 The Clean Power Plan offers an
emissions banking, trading, and credit program as a valid
compliance option.143 Nothing in current state law prevents North
Carolina from implementing a trading program, therefore, DEQ
will be authorized to implement a trading program for CO2
emissions credits into North Carolina’s SIP under the Clean Power
Plan.
Though a trading system is not necessarily required by the
Clean Power Plan, a compliance plan is necessary, and a trading
program is a valid compliance option for the plan.144 In addition,
even though the initial reduction of emissions will not be
voluntary, some EGUs may choose to voluntarily reduce emissions
further in order to receive allowances and participate in a trading
program.145 By doing this, EGUs can increase revenue while
reducing regulatory costs.146
Regulations within North Carolina’s Administrative Code also
support transfers of emissions allowances for NOx, SO2, and ozone
season NOx to comply with legislation enforcing the standards
required under Title IV of the Clean Air Act. These regulations
apply to all North Carolina CAIR NOx units, CAIR SO2 units, and
CAIR NOx ozone season units that are subject to the NOx, SO2,
and NOx ozone season trading programs, respectively, unless they
142

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107(a)(12) (2014) (directing the
Environmental Management Commission “[t]o develop and adopt a program of
incentives to promote voluntary reductions of emissions of air contaminants,
including, but not limited to, emissions banking and trading and credit for
voluntary early reduction of emissions”).
143
See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64733.
144
See id.
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(March
2015),
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fall into the category of “investor-owned public utilities” regulated
by the Clean Smokestacks Act.147
In implementing state legislation, North Carolina regulations
provide that the EPA shall administer the allowance tracking
program.148 Furthermore, the regulations provide that the owners
and operators of each emitting source shall have a compliance
account in the EPA administered tracking system that satisfies the
NOx, SO2, and ozone season NOx requirements laid out in the
Code of Federal Regulations.149 Lastly, the regulations provide that
any person may apply to open a general account to hold and
transfer allowances and any person who has a compliance account
or general account may bank allowances for future use or
transfer.150 In simpler terms, these regulations state that North
Carolina sources emitting NOx, SO2, and ozone season NOx can
have accounts, administered by the EPA, in which they can buy,
sell, bank, and transfer emission allowances. Therefore, any unit
that is not required to transfer emissions allowances to the State is
allowed to transfer emissions as per the regulations discussed
above.
B.

Existing State Restrictions on Trading for Air Quality
In addition to North Carolina statutes and regulations on air
quality, existing North Carolina restrictions on trading for air
quality also support emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan
without authorization from the North Carolina General Assembly.
Some state legislation placed certain limits on trading by requiring
actual emission reductions through emission controls. The legality
of emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan is supported
through existing state restrictions on trading for air quality sparked
from: (1) the Acid Rain Cap & Trade Program, and (2) The North
Carolina Clean Smokestacks Act.
147

See 15A N.C. ADMIN CODE 2D.2401(b) (2015); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
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1.

Acid Rain Cap & Trade Program
As discussed above, the Acid Rain Program was established
under Title IV of the 1990 CAA Amendments.151 The Acid Rain
Program’s (“ARP”) cap and trade system allows EGUs to buy and
sell allowances to meet compliance.152 However, during at least the
first five years of the ARP, North Carolina was among the major
net importers of emissions allowances, continuing to pollute while
purchasing allowances rather than cleaning up emissions to sell
allowances to others.153 This continued until 2002, when North
Carolina passed the Clean Smokestacks Act. Therefore, the Acid
Rain Program establishes precedent for emissions trading within
North Carolina without authorization from the General Assembly.
2.

The North Carolina Clean Smokestacks Act
North Carolina law does not per se prohibit interstate
emissions allowance trading. The Clean Smokestacks Act is the
single example of North Carolina legislation explicitly prohibiting
one form of interstate emissions allowance trading due to a range
of factors.154
North Carolina’s air quality was an increasingly significant
concern by the late 1990s, with more than half of the electric
power generated by forty-five coal-fired units, nearly all built in
the 1970s or earlier.155 In 1999, North Carolina experienced sixtyeight unhealthy air days, ranking it fifth in the country.156
Furthermore, smog in North Carolina during April through
October 1997 was estimated to have caused 19,000 respiratoryrelated hospital admissions, 5,700 respiratory visits to emergency
rooms, and 240,000 asthma attacks.157
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During public hearings in 2000, regarding rules for complying
with the EPA’s NOx SIP Call, the public of North Carolina showed
vigorous support for state action, resulting in state legislators
proposing language for more far reaching pollution reduction.158
The original proposal identified the pre-1977 power plants as the
dominant sources of SO2 and mercury, and nearly half the NOx
emissions in the state.159 The plan also documented proven
emission control technologies that could dramatically reduce these
emissions.160 The Senate examined the first version of the Clean
Smokestacks bill on April 1, 2001.161 After many debates and
several amendments to the bill, Congress passed the final version
of the Clean Smokestacks Act in June of 2002.162
The Clean Smokestacks Act requires power companies within
North Carolina to reduce their smog- and haze-forming emissions
by approximately three-fourths over the next decade.163 Under the
act, coal-fired power plants must achieve a 77-percent cut in NOx
emissions by 2009 and a 73-percent cut in SO2 emissions by
2013.164 Therefore, the Clean Smokestacks Act had the same, if not
stricter, goals as the Acid Rain Program. The significant difference
is that, under the Clean Smokestacks Act, North Carolina’s two
largest investor-owned utility companies, Duke Power Company
and Progress Energy Corporation (now together Duke Energy),
must achieve these emissions cuts through actual reductions at
their 14 power plants within the state—not by buying or trading
emissions allowances from utilities in other states, as allowed
under federal regulations.165 The State wanted emissions reductions
over trading to ensure that utilities in neighboring states did not
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negate the gains achieved in North Carolina by purchasing the
rights to increase or avoid controlling their own emissions.166
The Act did not allow the utilities to sell emissions allowances,
but instead required the two utilities to formally sign over their
emissions allowances to the State.167 “The State Treasurer shall
hold emissions allowances that are transferred to the State . . . in
trust for the people of this State and shall sell, trade, transfer, or
otherwise dispose of the emissions allowances only as the General
Assembly shall provide by law.”168 So far, the General Assembly
has remained silent on the State’s uses of these emissions
allowances. Therefore, the Clean Smokestacks Act became
legislation that explicitly prohibited North Carolina’s participation
in a trading market for NOx and SO2 emissions allowances.
Currently, North Carolinians are breathing cleaner air today
than any time in decades.169 Harmful emissions from coal-fired
power plants operating in North Carolina have been drastically cut
following the passage of the NC Clean Smokestacks Act in
2002.170 Equipped with 21st century control technology, North
Carolina’s power plants are among the most efficient and least
polluting coal fleet in the nation.171 The urgency to reduce in-state
emissions is not as prevalent as before the Clean Smokestacks Act
was passed. Additionally, it is not likely that North Carolina would
address CO2 the same way it did SO2 and NOx, because CO2 poses
a global threat while the other two pollutants generally cause
problems on a regional basis.172 Furthermore, North Carolina’s
participation in a CO2 trading system could potentially be a costefficient option to help further reduce CO2 emissions. Therefore,
there is no reason to prevent the implementation of an emissions
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allowance trading system in North Carolina. In conclusion, a CO2
emissions trading program should be legal in North Carolina,
unless the North Carolina General Assembly were to pass similar
legislation applying the Clean Smokestacks Act to CO2 emissions.
This North Carolina case study illustrates that precedent exists
for states engaging in emissions trading programs without explicit
authorization from their general assemblies. As long as states do
not have existing legislation similar to North Carolina’s Clean
Smokestacks Act they will not face legal issues by including an
emissions trading program within their Clean Power Plan SIP.
Simplifying matters further, even if states had legislation similar to
North Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act, they would only bar a
Clean Power Plan trading program if they explicitly prohibited
CO2 emissions trading.
V.
CONCLUSION
The Clean Power Plan is an expansive regulation taking
historic and important action on climate change, one of the greatest
environmental and public health challenges we face.173 This costly
plan affects the entire electricity sector across the United States as
a whole, yet will yield billions of dollars in significant benefits
over time.174 Emissions trading can significantly lower state
compliance costs, while at the same time promoting cheaper
cleaner energy alternatives to traditional burning of fossil fuels.175
Among the many legal challenges the Clean Power Plan will
face in court, the legality of emissions trading seems to be one of
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the most unreasonable. Courts should not find emissions trading
under the plan to be illegal on the basis of ambiguity and lack of
explicit approval in CAA section 111(d). Furthermore, emissions
trading is supported by several regulations and other legislation
that have all been upheld by the courts; several by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Lastly, state general assembly authorization
should not be required for inclusion of emissions trading within
Clean Power Plan SIPs. Analysis of North Carolina’s legislative
history reveals that it is possible for states to engage in emissions
trading without explicit authorization by state legislatures.
Emissions trading is a legal, cost-efficient method of controlling
certain types of air pollution, and there is no reason it should be
deemed illegal when it comes to CO2.

